We consider a procurement auction, where each supplier has private costs and submits a stepped supply function. We solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and show that the equilibrium has a price instability in the sense that a minor change in a supplier's cost sometimes result in a major change in the market price. In wholesale electricity markets, we predict that the bid price of the most expensive production unit can change by 1-10% due to price instability. The price instability is reduced when suppliers have more steps in their supply functions for a given production technology. In the limit, as the number of steps increases and the cost uncertainty decreases, the Bayesian equilibrium converges to a pure-strategy NE without price instability, the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE).
Introduction
Each year multi-unit auctions trade divisible-goods worth trillions of dollars, for example in wholesale electricity markets and treasury bond auctions. Most multiunit auctions are organized as uniform-price auctions, where each accepted bid is transacted at the clearing price. The bidding format is typically such that each bidder submits a set of bids that together form a stepped bid function. Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) showed that this type of bidding format introduces price instability; in procurement auctions there are large changes in bid prices for small realized changes in the production cost of a supplier. They therefore argued that approximating Nash equilibria (NE) of stepped supply functions by smooth supply function equilibria (SFE), as in Green and Newbery (1992) , is inappropriate since this approximation cannot capture price instability. However, suppliers in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) can only choose one bid price for their whole production capacity and Newbery (1998) conjectured that the price instability would become smaller with more steps in the bid functions and disappear in the limit when the number of steps increases towards in…nity. In this paper we analyse the price stability issue in detail and we are the …rst to prove that Newbery's conjecture is correct. However, our results also predict that the price instability can be signi…cant in practice where the number of steps is …nite. We focus on procurement auctions, but results are analogous for sales auctions.
The mechanism behind von der Fehr and Harbord's result is similar to the Bertrand-Edgeworth game (Edgeworth, 1925) . A supplier would …nd it optimal to undercut a competitor's bid unless the bid price is su¢ ciently uncertain or unless its mark-up is non-positive.
1 If the cost uncertainty is small, the bid price variation therefore needs to be much higher than the cost variation in equilibrium, i.e. price instability. In the limit where the cost uncertainty is zero, price instability corresponds to a mixed-strategy NE as in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) . 2 We consider cases where each producer submits a set of bids that together form a stepped supply function. Thus the quantity increment of each bid becomes smaller when each bidder submits supply functions with more steps. This decreases the incentive to undercut one of the competitor's bid prices, because there is less to gain from undercutting if it has less impact on sales. This explains our convergence result: the bid price uncertainty of each bid can be smaller if bidders make more bids with smaller quantity increments.
We generalize von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) model by considering a procurement auction where each supplier sells a number of homogenous indivisible units. Indivisible units could arise from restrictions in the bidding format, which we are interested in, but also from constraints and non-convexities in the production technology. Each supplier o¤ers each of its indivisible units at a unit price. Suppliers have private and independent costs; each supplier receives a signal with full information about its own production costs, but is generally imperfectly informed of the competitors'costs. A supplier makes a higher bid for a higher signal (cost), which gives rise to a bid range for each indivisible unit of the supplier, as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
We show that if the cost uncertainty is su¢ ciently small and indivisible units are su¢ ciently small, then there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the bid ranges for the di¤erent units of a supplier will not overlap, as illustrated in Fig.  1 . We call this property step separation. In this case we can explicitly solve for equilibria in the multi-unit auction. We prove that this is the unique equilibrium if the auctioneer's demand is uncertain and su¢ ciently evenly distributed. We also show that the size of the bid range for a supplier's unit n (the n'th cheapest unit of a supplier) is approximately given by (I 1) (p n c n ) =n, where I is the number of symmetric producers and p n c n is the approximate mark-up for the unit. From this formula and stylized facts of wholesale electricity markets, we predict that a minor change in the cost of the most expensive production unit could change its bid by between 1% and 10%. We predict that price instability will be less pronounced for less expensive units in wholesale electricity markets.
As conjectured by Newbery (1998) , it follows from our results that the price instability would decrease if each supplier was allowed to submit more bids. In our model this corresponds to a reduction in the size of indivisible units. In the limit where costs are common knowledge and units are in…nitesimally small, our Bayesian Nash equilibrium converges to Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) smooth, pure-strategy supply function equilibrium (SFE), which does not have this type of price instability. This gives support to the use of smooth supply function equilibria to approximate stepped supply function equilibria in wholesale electricity markets (Anderson and Hu, 2008; Green and Newbery, 1992; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010) and treasury auctions (Wang and Zender, 2002) . This type of equilibrium convergence also appears to occur in practice. Empirical studies of the wholesale electricity market in Texas (ERCOT) show that o¤ers of the two to three largest …rms in this market, who submit many bids per supplier, roughly match Klemperer and Meyer's …rst-order condition for continuous supply functions, while the …t is worse for small producers with fewer bids per supplier (Hortaçsu and Puller, 2008; Sioshansi and Oren, 2007) . Thus, the smooth supply-function approximation is rough in some circumstances, and models that consider details in the bidding format are sometimes preferable in practice (Kastl, 2011; Kastl, 2012; Wolak, 2007) .
A supplier's optimal set of bids for its indivisible units is determined from the characteristics of its residual demand curve.
3 When submitting its set of bids, a 3 The residual demand at a speci…c price is given by demand at that price less competitors'
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Figure 1: Illustration of price instability where small variations in costs introduces large changes in the bid prices of a supplier. Bid and marginal cost ranges of its indivisible units are non-overlapping in this example. In addition, the maximum bid of one unit equals the minimum bid of the next unit. We refer to this as step-separation without gaps.
supplier's residual demand curve is uncertain. This is due to uncertainties in the auctioneer's demand and/or uncertainties in competitors' stepped supply functions, because of imperfect knowledge of competitors'costs or because they randomize their bids. A methodological contribution in this paper is that we develop a discrete version of Anderson and Philpott's (2002b) market distribution function and Wilson's (1979) probability distribution of the market price to characterize the uncertainty of a producer's residual demand. We also derive optimality conditions for the best response of a producer facing a stochastic residual demand process that has been characterized by a discrete market distribution function. This new tool should be of general interest for theoretical and empirical studies of auctions with multiple indivisible units. Kastl (2012) and Wolak (2007) present related necessary optimality conditions; our main contribution is that we establish su¢ cient conditions for global optimality of stepped o¤ers, which are crucial when Nash equilibria are constructed in multi-unit auctions with indivisible units. Similar to Holmberg et al. (2013) , our equilibrium convergence proof partly relies on the convergence theory for Ordinary Di¤erential Equations (ODEs). However, note that Holmberg et al. (2013) prove convergence for the case when quantities are chosen from a continuous set and bid prices are chosen from a discrete set; a setting for which price instability is not an issue. 4 In our model, as in von sales as that price.
der Fehr and Harbord (1993) , bid prices are chosen from a continuous set, while permissible quantities are discrete, which introduces price instability. Except for Holmberg et al. (2013) , our purpose, methodology and results signi…cantly depart from previous convergence studies of equilibria in multi-unit auctions by for example Reny (1999) and McAdams (2003) . These approaches use existence of Nash equilibria for a discrete strategy space and equilibrium convergence to establish that there exists equilibria in the limit game with a continuous strategy space. Unlike them, we use a constructive approach to establish existence by deriving expressions for the Nash equilibria. Because of the controversy raised by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Newbery (1998) , we are interested in the properties of the Nash equilibria in multi-unit auctions and the extent to which they exhibit price instability.
There are a number of papers (Hortaçsu and McAdams, 2010; Rostek and Weretka, 2012; Vives, 2011; Wilson, 1979 ) that analyse multi-unit auctions with divisible-goods where bidders have private information and submit smooth bid functions. Anwar (2006) and Ausubel et al. (2014) are more similar to our study in that they analyse Nash equilibria of stepped bid functions. However, our main contributions do not overlap with their results, because they do not explicitly solve for Nash equilibria in this setting, quantify the price instability or prove equilibrium convergence. In particular, the analysis of stepped bid functions in Ausubel et al. (2014) is limited to cases where each bidder submits two bids.
We introduce the model in Section 2. In Section 3 we derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions, explicitly solve for Bayesian NE and prove equilibrium convergence for our baseline model with a symmetric duopoly. Section 4 extends this to multiple …rms for the special case when costs are common knowledge. Section 4.1 uses stylized facts to predict price instability in wholesale electricity markets. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
In our baseline model, I = 2 producers compete in a single-shot game by bidding in a uniform-price auction. Each …rm has N production units of equal size h with a total production capacity q = N h.
5 Producers have private and independent costs. The cost of each …rm i is decided by a private signal i , which is chosen by nature and which is not observed by the competitor. 6 There is no loss in generality in assuming that the range of i values is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], so that the 5 Production capacities in our procurement setting corresponds to purchase constraints in sales auctions. As an example, the U.S. Treasury auction has a 35% rule, which prevents anyone from buying more than 35% of the auctioneer's supply. This is to avoid a situation where a single bidder can corner the market. 6 Our results would change if suppliers' costs were dependent. It is less critical whether a producer receives a one-dimensional or multi-dimensional signal, such as a vector with individual cost information for each of its production units. The Bayesian NE with step separation that we solve for would still be the same as long as each unit has the same probability distribution for its costs, even if the production costs of a supplier's units are imperfectly correlated. probability distribution of a signal is G ( i ) = i . 7 We assume that suppliers are symmetric ex-ante; the marginal cost for the n'th unit of …rm i is given by c n ( i ). We suppose that c n ( i ) is weakly and continuously increasing in i and strictly increasing in n. In the special case where costs do not depend on signals, i.e. costs are common knowledge among producers, independent signals e¤ectively act as randomization devices that help producers to independently randomize their strategies in a mixed-strategy NE, as in the puri…cation theorem by Harsanyi (1973) . We write C n ( i ) = h P n m=1 c m ( i ) for the total cost for producer i of supplying an amount nh. We assume that the highest marginal cost, c N (1), is strictly smaller than the reservation price p. In Section 4, we extend the duopoly model to multiple suppliers.
We consider Bayesian Nash equilibria, where each producer i …rst observes its signal i and then chooses an optimal bid price p i n ( i ) for each unit n 2 f1; : : : ; N g. We consider cases where p i n ( i ) is a continuous, piece-wise smooth, strictly increasing function of its signal i and strictly increasing with respect to the unit number n. Thus outcomes where a sharing rule is needed to clear the auction can be neglected.
Given a value of i , we can calculate the stepped supply of …rm i as a function of price as follows:
is a weakly decreasing function of i and weakly increasing with respect to p.
Similar to von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), we assume that demand is uncertain and inelastic up to the reservation price. The demand shock is realized after producers have submitted their bids and is independent of producers' signals. In wholesale electricity markets the shock could correspond to uncertainty in consumers' demand (including own production, e.g. solar power) and uncertainty in the output of renewable power (e.g. wind power) or must-run plants from non-strategic competitors. 8 We consider a similar discreteness on the demand side, which is natural if the discreteness has been imposed by the bidding format. We assume that the demand shock can take values on the set Q (h) = f0; h; 2h; 3h:::; 2N hg, where each element in the set Q (h) occurs with a positive probability. We let F ( ) be the probability distribution of the demand shock , i.e. F (b) = Pr ( b) with b 2 Q (h), and let f ( ) be the probability mass function
The auctioneer clears the market at the lowest price where supply is weakly 7 Note that we are free to choose the cost parameterization to achieve this. Assume that there is some signal e with the probability distribution e G (e ) and cost function e c n (e ), for which this is not true. Then we can always de…ne a new signal = e G (e ) and de…ne a new cost function c n ( ) = e c n ( e G 1 ( )), which would satisfy our assumptions. 8 There is an analogous supply shock in many multi-unit sales auctions. In treasury auctions there is often an uncertain amount of non-competitive bids from many small non-strategic investors (Wang and Zender, 2002; Rostek et al., 2010) . Thus the remaining amount of treasury securities available to the large strategic investors is uncertain. 6 larger than demand.
We consider a uniform-price auction, so all accepted o¤ers are paid the clearing price p. Thus, the payo¤ of a producer i selling n units at price p is:
3 Analysis
Optimality conditions
We start by deriving the best response of a producer to a stochastic residual demand. As a characterization of the residual demand, we let i (n; p) be the probability that the o¤er of the nth unit of producer i is rejected if o¤ered at the price p. This probability depends on the random demand shock and the cost signal j of the competitor j 6 = i. Thus
It follows on our assumptions that i (n; p) will be continuous and piecewise smooth as a function of p. This probability is a discrete version of Anderson and Philpott's (2002b) market distribution function, which corresponds to Wilson's (1979) probability distribution of the market price. We can now show that
Lemma 1
provided that
exists.
In the case where the left and right derivatives of
do not match, then it is easy to see that (1) will still hold provided we choose either left or right derivatives consistently. The result in (1) can be interpreted as follows. Assume that …rm i increases the o¤er price of its unit n, then there are two counteracting e¤ects on the expected pay-o¤. The revenue increases for outcomes when the o¤er for unit n is price-setting, which occurs with the probability i (n + 1; r n ) i (n; r n ). Thus the …rst term in (1) corresponds to a price-e¤ect; the marginal gain from increasing the bid price of the nth unit if acceptance was unchanged. On the other hand, a higher bid price means that there is a higher risk that the o¤er of the nth unit is rejected. This is the quantity e¤ect. The marginal loss in pro…t is given by the increased rejection probability
for the nth unit 7 times the pay-o¤ from this unit when it is on the margin of being accepted. Thus @ i (r 1 ;r 2 ;:::r N ; i ) @rn equals the price e¤ect minus the loss related to the quantity e¤ect. We can identify the right-hand side of (1) as being a discrete version of Anderson and Philpott's (2002b) Z function for uniform-price auctions.
9 Thus we de…ne:
De…nition 1 Z i (n; r n ; i ) = nh ( i (n + 1; r n ) i (n; r n ))
where we take the right hand derivative of i if left and right derivatives do not match.
Hence, Z i (n; r n ; i ) is the right hand derivative of i with respect to r n , which is independent of other bid prices r m , where m 6 = n. We use Z i (n; r n ; i ) to denote the left hand derivative of i (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::r N ; i ) in the following result.
Lemma 2 A set of bids fr n g N n=1 is globally optimal for producer i for signal i if:
If i is di¤erentiable at r n then a necessary condition for bids fr n g N n=1 to be optimal for signal i is Z i (n; r n ; i ) = 0:
In case, the left and right derivatives di¤er at r n , the necessary condition generalizes to Z i (n; r n ; i ) 0 and Z i (n; r n ; i ) 0:
Intuitively, we can interpret Lemma 2 as follows: an o¤er r n ( i ) is optimal for unit n for signal i if the quantity e¤ect dominates for all prices above r n ( i ) and the price e¤ect dominates for all prices below this price.
Necessary properties of an equilibrium
In this subsection, we use the optimality conditions to derive necessary properties of an equilibrium. We will show that in many cases the equilibrium must have the property that the lowest bid in the bid range of unit n is at exactly the same price as the highest o¤er in the bid range for the previous unit n 1. We …rst prove that there are no gaps between the bid price ranges of successive units of a supplier.
Lemma 3 In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, p i k 1 (1) p i k (0) for each k 2 f2; : : : ; N g, i.e. there are no gaps between the bid ranges of successive units of a supplier i 2 f1; 2g. Moreover, for the highest realized cost, the highest bid of supplier i 2 f1; 2g is at the reservation price, i.e.
This result is established by showing that if player i has a gap with
so there is no o¤er in this range of prices, then player j 6 = i can always improve an o¤er in this range by increasing it. Thus, in equilibrium, there will also be a matching gap in the o¤er of player j. But this implies that player i will gain from increasing the bid p i k 1 (1). This contradicts the optimality of player i's bids.
Next, we will show that price ranges of successive units do not overlap; a property we call step separation. However, proving this requires additional conditions on costs and the demand uncertainty. The …rst condition we make use of is related to the cost functions where we require successive units of supplier i 2 f1; 2g not to have overlapping ranges for their marginal costs, as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Assumption 1: For all n = 2:::N and 2 (0; 1)
In order to characterize the uncertainty of the auctioneer's demand, we …nd it useful to introduce:
Note that both f (mh) and f ((m 1) h) are non-negative, so m 1. Assumption 2: Demand is su¢ ciently evenly distributed so that
for m 2 f2; : : : ; 2N g.
Lemma 4
Under Assumption 1 and 2, bid ranges for successive units of supplier i 2 f1; 2g do not overlap in an equilibrium, i.e. p i k 1 (1) p i k (0) for k 2 f2; : : : ; N g.
10
It follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that equilibria must necessarily have step separation without gaps, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , if cost uncertainty is su¢ -ciently small and the demand density is su¢ ciently even. In this case, we can also prove that the Bayesian equilibrium must be symmetric.
Lemma 5 Under Assumption 1 and 2, the Bayesian NE must be symmetric, i.e. p 1 n ( ) = p 2 n ( ) for 2 [0; 1] and n 2 f1; : : : ; N g : 10 Lemma 10 in the Appendix proves that this statement would also hold for a less stringent, but also more complex inequality than (6).
Existence results
In the previous section we derived necessary properties for an equilibrium -symmetry and step separation without gaps -for cases where the cost uncertainty is su¢ ciently small and the demand shock is su¢ ciently evenly distributed. In this section we establish existence of such an equilibrium for a weaker assumption on the demand uncertainty by explicitly solving for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium with step separation and no gaps. If the stricter condition in (6) is satis…ed, then we can prove that this equilibrium is the unique Bayesian NE.
Proposition 1 The set of solutions fp n ( )g N n=1 as de…ned by the end-conditions
constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if Assumption 1 is satis…ed and jm m+b n (m 1) m 1+b n j 1
for all (m; b n) 2 f1; : : : ; N g f1; : : : ; N g. The equilibrium is unique if, in addition, Assumption 2 is satis…ed. Mark-ups are strictly positive in equilibrium,
Note that the condition in (8) is always satis…ed if indivisible production units are su¢ ciently small. In the special case when demand is uniformly distributed ( 2n ! 0), then (7) can be simpli…ed to:
Proposition 1 simpli…es as follows when costs are common knowledge. In this limit of our model, the private signals do not in ‡uence costs; they are simply used as randomization devices by the producers when choosing their bids. Thus our symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium corresponds to a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1 The set of solutions fp n ( )g N n=1 as de…ned by the end-conditions
constitutes a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, if costs are common knowledge and jm m+n (m 1) m 1+n j 1
for all (m; n) 2 f1; : : : ; N g f1; : : : ; N g. The equilibrium is unique if, in addition, Assumption 2 is satis…ed.
Equilibrium convergence
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of smooth supply functions when costs are common knowledge and units are perfectly divisible. We know from Holmberg (2008) and Anderson (2013) that there is a unique symmetric supply function equilibrium for production capacities q when inelastic demand has support in the range [0; 2q]. We letC 0 (Q) be the marginal cost of the divisible output Q. The unique, symmetric SFE for duopoly markets can be determined from Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) 
and the boundary condition P ( q) = p. Note that we have rewritten the di¤erential equation so that it is on the standard form. In this section we will refer to the solution of this di¤erential equation as the continuous solution.
In this subsection we consider the special case where costs of the indivisible units are common knowledge; this is in line with standard SFE models and the model in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) . Hence, it follows from Corollary 1 and p n 1 (1) = p n (0) that equilibrium bids for the highest signal can be determined from the following di¤erence equation:
A solution to this di¤erence equation is referred to as a discrete solution.
In the equilibrium convergence proof below, we consider a sequence of auctions with successively smaller units h and larger N = q h , such that the exogenous shock distribution has a well-de…ned continuous probability density in the limit
and where f 0 ( ) =f ( ) is bounded in the interval [0; 2q]. Below we will show that mixed-strategy NE of auctions in this sequence converges to the SFE model in the limit as the size of the indivisible production units h decreases towards 0. Our convergence proof goes through similar steps as in the proof of convergence of stepped pure-strategy NE by Holmberg et al. (2013) . We …rst show that the di¤erence equation in (12) converges to Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) di¤erential equation. This type of convergence is referred to as consistency in the numerical analysis of di¤erential equations (Le Veque, 2007) .
Lemma 6
The di¤erence equation
can be approximated by
and is consistent with the di¤erential equation in (11) if
If we let the error be the di¤erence between the continuous and discrete solutions, then the convergence of the di¤erential and di¤erence equations (consistency) ensures that the local error that is introduced over a short price interval is reduced as the size of the production units, h, becomes small. However, this does not ensure that the discrete solution will converge to the continuous solution when h ! 0, because accumulated errors may still grow at an unbounded rate along a …xed interval as h becomes smaller and the number of production units increases. Hence another step in the convergence analysis is to establish stability, i.e. that small changes in p n (1) does not drastically change p n (0). This is veri…ed in the proposition below. The proposition also shows that the converging discrete solution is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let P (Q) be the unique pure-strategy continuous supply function equilibrium for divisible units, then there exists a corresponding mixed-strategy NE for indivisible units with properties as in Corollary 1, which converges to the continuous supply function equilibrium in the sense that p n ( i ) ! P (nh) when
, i.e. the slope of the probability density of the demand shock is relatively small in the limit, then this ensures that the mixedstrategy NE is the unique equilibrium in the auction with indivisible units when h ! 0.
As shown by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , the SFE for divisible units is ex-post optimal and it does not depend on the demand shock distribution. This is di¤erent to our model for indivisible units where equilibrium bids do depend on the demand uncertainty when h > 0. If indivisible production units are su¢ ciently small or if demand shocks are su¢ ciently uniformly distributed, then m is close to zero, and second-order e¤ects are negligible. For such cases, Lemma 7 below establishes that the bid price p n increases when the di¤erence f (2nh) f ((2n 1) h), and hence We end this section with some simple examples. When the demand is uniformly distributed (so 2n = 0), we obtain from (9) that:
We illustrate this formula in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for 5 and 20 units per …rm, respectively. In Figure 3 we also compare our equilibrium for indivisible units with the supply function equilibrium for divisible goods. Formulas for the latter can be found in Anderson and Philpott (2002a) and Holmberg (2008) . The comparison illustrates that the supply function equilibrium approximation works well in this example.
Extension: Multiple …rms
In this section we generalize results to I 2 …rms for the special case when costs are common knowledge. We use K = I 1 to denote the number of competitors of a supplier. Proposition 3 In an oligopoly market with I = K + 1 2 symmetric producers with costs that are common knowledge, the set of solutions fp n ( )g N n=1 as de…ned by the end-conditions p N (1) = p p n (1) = p n+1 (0) 8n 2 f1; : : : ; N 1g
where is a random variable that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] and
constitutes a symmetric mixed-strategy NE, if
for all (m; n) 2 f1; : : : ; N g f1; : : : ; N g.
(16) is satis…ed when demand is su¢ ciently close to a uniform distribution or when units are su¢ ciently small. In case demand is uniformly distributed, we 14 have from Proposition 3 and the binomial theorem that
This gives the result below, where the approximation in (18) follows from a Taylor expansion of (14).
Corollary 2 In an oligopoly market with uniformly distributed demand and I = K + 1 2 symmetric producers with costs that are common knowledge among bidders, the set of solutions fp n ( )g N n=1 as de…ned by the end-conditions p N (1) = p p n (1) = p n+1 (0) 8n 2 f1; : : : ; N 1g
where is a random variable that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1], constitutes a symmetric mixed-strategy NE. The bid range of the mixed-strategy NE can be approximated from:
It follows from Corollary 2 that equilibrium bids for the highest signal can be determined from the following di¤erence equation:
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6 in the Appendix, we can use (18) to prove that this di¤erence equation is consistent with the …rst-order condition of an SFE for multiple …rms. It follows from Corollary 2 that
which ensures that the discrete solution is numerically stable also for multiple …rms. Thus we can use an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 2 to show that the mixed-strategy NE in Corollary 2 converges to a pure-strategy SFE also for I 2 …rms.
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Price instability in wholesale electricity markets
In Figure 4 , we illustrate Corollary 2 for 6 …rms and 20 indivisible units per …rm. Each indivisible unit has the size 0.5, so that each …rm has the maximum output 10. As expected from the theory on smooth SFE (Holmberg, 2008) , this graph also illustrates that mark-ups tend to be convex with respect to output in oligopoly markets. This becomes even more pronounced in a more competitive market, where mark-ups are essentially zero far below the production capacity and then take o¤ near the production capacity. This is consistent with hockey-stick bidding that has been observed in practice, i.e. observed bid prices and estimated mark-ups become drastically larger near the total production capacity of the market (Hurlbut et al., 2004; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010) . In this case, mark-ups will be largest and the bid range will be widest for units with the highest marginal cost. Typically wholesale electricity markets have reservation prices in the range $1.000-$100.000/MWh (Holmberg et al., 2013; Stoft, 2002) , which normally is signi…cantly higher than the marginal cost of the most expensive unit. Market concentration in wholesale electricity markets as measured by the Her…ndahl Hirschman Index (HHI) is typically in the range 1000-2000, both in Europe (Newbery, 2009) and U.S. (Bushnell et al., 2008) . This degree of market concentration can be represented by 5-10 symmetric …rms. From the discussion in Holmberg et al. (2013) and Green and Newbery (1992) , it is reasonable to assume that each representative …rm submits 50-500 bids each. From these stylized facts, it follows from (18) that the bid range of the most expensive unit is signi…cant, 1-10% of the reservation price. However, it is rare that bids from the most expensive units are accepted in wholesale electricity markets. Typically this only occurs 0.1% of the time or even more seldom. The price instability is expected to be lower for less expensive units that typically have smaller mark-ups. In practice producers have sold some of their output in advance with forward contracts. As shown by Newbery (1998) and Holmberg (2011) this lowers mark-ups in electricity markets, and accordingly it should also mitigate price-instability.
Conclusions
We consider a procurement multi-unit auction where each supplier makes a bid for each of its homogenous indivisible units. This set-up can represent restrictions in the bidding format, which is our main interest, but also restrictions in the production technology, such as production constraints or non-convex costs. Producers have private information on their costs. A producer submits a higher bid for a unit when its costs are higher. This gives a bid range for each unit of the supplier. We show that if the cost uncertainty is su¢ ciently small and units are su¢ ciently small, then there exists a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which the bid ranges for the di¤erent units of a supplier do not overlap. We call this property step separation. In this case we can explicitly solve for equilibria in the multi-unit auction. We prove that this is the unique equilibrium if the auctioneer's demand is uncertain and su¢ ciently evenly distributed. This Bayesian NE has a price in- Figure 4 : Bids for the unique, symmetric mixed-strategy NE bids in an oligopoly market with 6 …rms and uniformly distributed demand.
stability. A small cost change for a unit can have a much larger impact on the bid price of the unit. The length of the bid range for a production unit n (which is the n'th cheapest unit of a supplier) is approximately given by (I 1) (p n c n ) =n, where I is the number of producers and p n c n is the approximate mark-up for unit n. We estimate that minor cost changes can change the bid price of the most expensive unit in wholesale electricity markets by 1-10%. We predict that the price instability will be lower for cheaper units in electricity markets, and when producers hedge their output by selling forward contracts. As price instability worsens welfare for risk averse market participants, there are advantages with market designs that mitigate price instability. The price instability decreases when producers are allowed to submit more bids. We prove that the Bayesian NE of our set-up converges to a pure-strategy, smooth supply function equilibrium (SFE) without price instability when both the unit size and cost uncertainty decreases towards zero. This result gives support to the use of smooth SFE to approximate bidding with stepped supply functions in wholesale electricity markets, as in Green and Newbery (1992) . Previously, the convergence of stepped SFE to smooth SFE has been established by Holmberg et al. (2013) for cases where ticks-sizes are large and the size of indivisible units is small, so that price instability is not an issue. We also believe that price instability can be avoided in market designs with piece-wise linear supply functions, as in the wholesale electricity markets in the Nordic countries, Nord Pool, and France, Power Next.
The paper also contributes by introducing a discrete version of Anderson and Philpott's (2002b) market distribution function and Wilson's (1979) probability distribution of the market price. We use this tool to characterize the uncertainty in the residual demand of a producer. We also derive conditions for the globally best response of a producer facing a given discrete market distribution function. These conditions can be used in both empirical and theoretical studies of auctions with multiple indivisible units.
Similar to SFE (Anderson, 2013; Holmberg, 2008) our uniqueness result relies on the auctioneer's demand varying in a su¢ ciently wide range. More equilibria would occur if this demand range was reduced. If demand was certain and production capacities non-restrictive, then there is likely to be a continuum of similar equilibria for indivisible units, as is the case for continuous SFE of divisible units (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989) . In this case, it has been popular in the literature that analyses bidding formats with stepped bid functions to select the equilibrium that does not have price instability. When bidders'costs/values are common knowledge this corresponds to selecting a pure-strategy NE, as in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Kremer and Nyborg (2004a; 2004b) and Fabra et al. (2006) . These NE are rather extreme, the market price is either at the marginal cost or reservation price. Similar bidding behaviour has been observed in the capacity market of New York's electricity market, which is dominated by one supplier and where the demand variation is small (Schwenen, 2012) . Still, we are not convinced that NE without price instability will always be selected when the demand variation is small. Especially as the price instability becomes smaller if bidders are allowed to choose more steps in their supply functions. With su¢ ciently many steps, a market participant would not be able to notice the price instability in markets or experiments, it would become negligible in comparison to erratic behaviour of the agents and other types of noise. Under such circumstances it does not seem likely that price instability would be a reliable criterion for equilibrium selection.
In the proofs, we …nd it convenient to identify the values of that give rise to bid prices for given units n. We de…ne b i (p; n) = sup( i : s i (p; i ) nh); n = 1; 2:::; N; with b i (p; n) = 0 if s i (p; 0) < nh. Thus b i is the probability that …rm i will sell at least n units at the clearing price p. It follows from our assumptions for p i n ( i ) that b i is increasing, continuous and piece-wise smooth with respect to the price and decreasing with respect to n. To simplify our equations, we set b i (p; 0) = 1 20 and b i (p; N + 1) = 0. We let
Thus b i (p; n) is the probability that an i value is chosen by nature such that an agent will sell exactly nh units at price p.
Lemma 8 The expected pro…t of producer i for a set of bids fr n g N n=1 and a signal i is given by:
where we choose
to equal the right hand derivative of i at the points where left and right derivatives do not match.
Proof. We …rst calculate the probability that producer i sells exactly n units. This can occur under two di¤erent circumstances. In the …rst case, r n is pricesetting. This occurs when the nth unit of producer i is accepted and the competitor's last accepted unit has a bid below r n . The probability for this event is i (n + 1; r n ) i (n; r n ). Next we consider the case where producer i sells exactly n units at a price p 2 (r n ; r n+1 ), which is set by the residual demand of producer i. This occurs when the nth unit of producer i is accepted and the competitor's last accepted unit has a bid in the interval (r n ; r n+1 ). The probability that the competitor has its last accepted bid in an interval [p; p + p] is given by i (n + 1; p + p) i (n + 1; p). When the derivative exists, this approaches
Thus we can write the total expected pro…t of the …rm as in (21). By assumption i (n + 1; p) has only isolated points where it is non-smooth, and consequently the choice of derivative value at these points will not a¤ect the integral.
Proof. (Lemma 1) We have from (21) that
which can be simpli…ed to (1). Proof. (Lemma 2) Suppose (3) is satis…ed and that there is another set of bids fr n g N n=1 , such that i (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::r N ; i ) < i (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::r N ; i ). This leads to a contradiction, because it follows from (3) and (2) that @ i (r 1 ;r 2 ;:::r N ; i ) @rn 0 for 21 almost all r n r n and that @ i (r 1 ;r 2 ;:::r N ; i ) @rn 0 for almost all r n r n . Thus the pro…t must (weakly) decrease as the set of bids is changed from fr n g N n=1 to fr n g N n=1 . We realize that this change can be done in steps without violating the constraint that bids must be monotonic with respect to n. Hence, the necessary conditions follow straightforwardly from the de…nition in (1).
We can derive the following result for the duopoly market that we are studying. This shows how i and Z i can be expressed in terms of b j values.
Lemma 9 In a duopoly market
and
where we interpret
as a right derivative where left and right derivatives di¤er.
Proof. An o¤er of n units at price p by producer i is rejected if the competitor j 6 = i o¤ers exactly m units at the price p, which occurs with probability b j (p; m), when demand at this price is less than n + m units, which has the probability F ((n + m 1) h). We get i (n; p) in (22) by summing across all m 2 f0; : : : ; N g. It now follows from Lemma 1 and (22) that
which can be simpli…ed to (23), because ) and m 6 = k 1. Now, …rst suppose that producer j makes some o¤er in this price range. Hence there is some e n, e with e p = p j e n (e ) 2 p
= 0 at e p, and so, from Lemma 9 and De…nition 1, Z j (e n; e p; e ) = @ j (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::r N ; e ) @r e n = e nh
because f ((e n + k 1) h) > 0 (we assume that every value of demand up to 2N is possible). Hence producer j would gain from increasing its bid for unit e n when observing signal e . This cannot occur in equilibrium, and so we deduce that there is no o¤er from producer j in the range p 
. Hence, producer i will gain by increasing its bid for unit k 1 when observing signal i = 1. Hence the strategy is not optimal for producer i and again we have a contradiction. We can use the same argument to rule out that p i N (1) < p:
Lemma 10 Under Assumption 1, bid ranges for successive units of supplier i 2 f1; 2g do not overlap in an equilibrium, i.e.
where
for n 2 f3; : : : ; N g.
Proof.
We let p i Z be the highest price at which there is an overlap for i, thus we have 
23
First we take the case that they are equal. By assumption, bid prices are strictly increasing with respect to the number of units for a given signal, so p 
for n k j + 3:
It now follows from Lemma 9 that :
From (24) we observe that
We will write
So we have from (25) and (27):
(k i 1). We deduce from (26) that
It follows from our assumptions that b j (p 0 ; m) is piece-wise di¤erentiable. We consider a presumed equilibrium. Hence, provided that we do not choose p 0 where some b j (p 0 ; m) is non-smooth, we deduce from the necessary conditions in Lemma 2 that
By assumption p i n ( ) is continuous with respect to . Thus by choosing p 0 below and su¢ ciently close to p i Z , and thereby X close enough to 1, we can ensure that the right hand side of (28) is strictly greater than zero, which would contradict (30). This leads to the conclusion that p Now we can use Lemma 9 to show
The rest of the proof follows from a contradiction achieved using the same argument as above, with m j instead of k j and a single term
Proof. (Lemma 4)
Below we show that (6) is su¢ cient to satisfy the conditions for Lemma 10. We can deduce immediately from De…nition 2that j n j < 1=(3n) implies that:
There are two inequalities in (24) that we need to establish. The …rst inequality can be written
We have to check four cases. (a) (n 1)f ((n 1) h) f ((n 3) h) > (n 2)f ((n 2) h) f ((n 2) h): From (31) applied at n 2 we have
and with (32) applied at n 1 we have
Since (n 1) 3n 6 3n 5 3n 4 3n 3 = 3n 4 3n 5 (n 2) > n 2;
we establish the inequality we require.
From (34) we can deduce
which immediately implies the inequality.
From (33) we obtain
This is immediate. Now we turn to the other inequality, we need to establish:
Again we have four cases to check. (a) (n 1)f (nh) f ((n 3) h) > (n 2)f ((n 1) h) f ((n 2) h): Using (32) and (33) we have
> (n 1) 3n 1 3n
Since (n 1) (3n 1) n(3n 5) = n + 1 > 0 we have (n 1) 3n 1 n 1 3n 5 > 1 which is enough to show the inequality we require. (b) (n 1)f (nh) f ((n 2) h) > (n 2)f ((n 1) h) f ((n 2) h): Since (n 1) (3n 1) 3n(n 2) = 2n + 1 > 0, we deduce that (n 1) 3n 1 3n > n 2. Then the inequality follows from (32). (c) (n 1)f (nh) f ((n 3) h) > (n 2)f ((n 1) h) f ((n 1) h): From (31) at n 1 we see that
Together with (35) we deduce that
Since (n 1)(3n 1)(3n 3) n(3n 5)(3n 2) = 5n 3 > 0, we have (n 1) n 3n 1 3n 5 3n 3 3n 2 > 1 and the result is established. (32) and (37) we deduce
However since (n 1)(3n 1)(3n 3) 3n(3n 2)(n 2) = 3n 2 + 3n 3 > 0 we have (n 1) 3n 1 3n 3n 3 3n 2 > n 2, and the inequality follows.
Lemma 11 Consider a duopoly market where each producer has step separation without gaps in its bidding strategy and consider a price p where there is a unique unit b n (p) such that b j (p; b n) 2 (0; 1), where producer j 6 = i is the competitor of producer i. In this case,
The …rst-order condition of a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, so that b n(r n ) = n and b i (r n ; n) = b j (r n ; n) = b (r n ; n) is given by:
(b (r n ; n) 2n + 1) n = (r n c n (b (r n ; n))) @b (r n ; n) @r n :
Proof. For m < b n(p) we have b j (p; m) = 1 and for m > b n(p) we have b j (p; m) = 0. Thus it follows from Lemma 9 that
which gives (38). In a symmetric equilibrium b n(r n ) = n, which yields (39), because the …rst-order condition is that Z i (n; r n ; i ) = 0 and we can divide all terms by hf ((2n 1) h) .
Proof. (Lemma 5) It follows from the necessary …rst-order condition implied by (38) and Z i (n; r n ; i ) = 0 that p n 2 f1; : : : ; N g. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it can be shown that …rms must submit identical bids for the lowest cost realization, i.e. p 
This gives a discrete estimate of the slope of the continuous solution if we replace values in the discrete system are replaced with samples of the continuous solution P (nh). To calculate the local truncation error, n , subtract this discrete estimate of the slope from the slope of the continuous solution, so
Hence, it follows from our assumptions that lim
Proof. (Proposition 2) Lemma 6 states that the discrete di¤erence equation is a consistent approximation of the continuous di¤erential equation. To show that the discrete solution converges to the continuous solution, it is necessary to prove that the stepped solution exists and is numerically stable, i.e., the error grows at a …nite rate over the …nite interval [a; b], where a =C 0 (0) and b = p. The proof is inspired by LeVeque's (2007) convergence proof for general one-step methods. It follows from Lemma 6 that dp n 1 (1) dp n (1) = ( 2n + 1) 1=(n 2n ) = 1
because 2n + 1 1 when 2n 0 and 2n + 1 1 when 2n 0. Thus we can introduce a Lipschitz constant = 1 (LeVeque, 2007) that uniformly bounds dp n 1 (1) dpn (1) for each h. De…ne the global error at the quantity nh by E n = p n (1) P (nh). It follows that the global error satis…es the following inequality at the unit N 1:
where N is the local truncation error as de…ned by (49). Similarly
Let max k for k 2 f1; : : : ; N g. From the inequality in (51) and = 1, we can show by induction:
The consistency property established in Lemma 6 ensures that the truncation error max can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing h. Moreover, p N (1) = P (q) = p, so E N = 0. Thus from (52), E k ! 0 when h ! 0, proving that the discrete solution converges to the continuous one.
We note that the inequality (8) is satis…ed when h is su¢ ciently small. Hence, it follows from Corollary 1 that the discrete solution corresponds to a mixedstrategy NE. The uniqueness condition corresponds to Assumption 2 when h ! 0. 
0:
Thus for the same or higher p n (1), a higher 2n will result in a higher p n ( i ) if h is su¢ ciently small, so that 2n ! 0. We have p N (1) = p irrespective of 2n . Thus for symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria with step separation without gaps, so that p n 1 (1) = p n (0), and su¢ ciently small h, a weakly higher 2n will weakly increase p n ( i ) for n 2 f1; : : : ; N g.
Lemma 13
In an oligopoly market Z i (n; p; i ) = nh 
where Z i (n; p; i ) is de…ned.
Proof. (Lemma 13) An o¤er of n units at price p by producer i is rejected if the competitors together o¤er exactly m units at the price p when demand is at most n + m 1 units. Thus Note that the binomial coe¢ cient in Lemma 14 is de…ned as follows:
It follows from Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 that:
Corollary 3 In an oligopoly market where producer i has K = I 1 competitors that submit step-separated o¤ers that are symmetric ex-ante (before private signals have been observed), then w (u; m K(n 1)) (Kn m) F ((n + m 1) h)
(1 u) Kn P m=K(n 1)
w (u; m K(n 1)) f ((n + m) h)
:
We can simplify this to:
w (u; v + 1) (v + 1) F ((n + v + K(n 1)) h)
w (u; v) f ((n + v + K(n 1)) h)
(1 u)
Next, we use (56) to simplify this further.
w (u; K; v) f ((n + v + K(n 1)) h)
w (u; K; v) f ((n + v + K(n 1)) h) ; which can be simpli…ed to (15). The di¤erential equation in (57) can be separated as follows: ndp p c n = g (u) du:
We integrate the left hand side from p n ( ) to p n (1) and the right-hand side from to 1. Hence, n ln p n (1) c n p n ( ) c n = Z 1 g (u) du;
which gives (14). Using Corollary 3 in Appendix E, it can be veri…ed that this is an equilibrium with a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.
